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The Joint Declaration and the CFA Agreement 
Although centred mainly on one provision in the Joint Declaration,1 the 'CFA 
debate' — triggered by the 'agreement' reached in 1991 in the Sino-British 
Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on the composition of the Court of Final Appeal2 
and a later Agreement between the British and Chinese Sides on the Question 
of the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong3 (seeking to limit to one the number 
of overseas judges on the five-member court) — may serve to illustrate the 
parties' (mis)perceptions and (mis)understandings of key elements in the 
treaty. 
Under applicable international rules of treaty interpretation,4 the respec-
tive terms in the Joint Declaration must be interpreted 'in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose.' Thus 
approached, it is doubtless that the 'ordinary meaning' to be assigned to the 
relevant article5 confers on the Court of Final Appeal discretion to decide when 
a requirement arises to invite judges from other common law jurisdictions, and 
whom and how many to invite. There is no qualification or proviso which could 
support an intention other than to grant the court full discretion regarding the 
exercise of its power. Such an interpretation is also demanded by the principle 
of 'institutional effectiveness,' favouring wide powers for institutions to per-
form their functions in the most effective manner. 
Further substantiation is equally drawn when the terms are examined in the 
light of the 'object and purpose' of a treaty aimed at preserving the stability and 
prosperity of a region endowed with a high degree of autonomy, including the 
power of final adjudication. Indeed, the importance to Hong Kong's stability 
and prosperity of maintaining the current advantages, derived from an inter-
national judicial link and ensuring the CFA's true independence and member-
ship of the highest standard, has also been recognised by the drafters of the Basic 
Law, who reaffirmed that the court 'may as required invite judges from other 
common law jurisdictions.'6 Basically, as stated by one observer, 
JD, Annex I, Art III, para 4. 
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 Hereafter 'the 1991 agreement.' A text of the agreement has not been published. 
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 The agreement, concluded on 9 June 1995 (hereafter 'the 1995 agreement'), consists of five clauses, 
reaffirming inter alia the four to one formula. Reprinted in (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 
207. 
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 See 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties, Arts 31-3. Note that these rules of treaty interpretation 
are considered customary international law and as such are binding on all states regardless of whether 
or not they are parties to the Convention: Guinea-Bissau v Senega! [1991] ICJ Reports 53, 70. 
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 Stipulating that 'The power of final judgment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall 
be vested in the court of final appeal in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which may 
as required invite judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court of final appeal.' 
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 BL82. 
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[t]he setting up of a Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong was to provide for 
continuity in the legal system and the rule of law even while ending the link 
to the Privy Council, ensuring the territory's stability. The provision for 
overseas judges to serve on the Court of Final Appeal was clearly intended 
to lend that court greater stature, so that domestic and foreign investors 
would continue to have confidence in the judicial system, thus ensuring the 
territory's prosperity. That being the case, too great a restriction on the 
court's right to invite overseas judges — both when they might be invited 
and how many might be invited — would work against giving the court the 
independence it is meant to enjoy and could, in fact, detract from the 
territory's stability and prosperity.7 
Whether account should be taken of the 1991 or 1995 agreements hinges 
on either constituting an 'agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation or the application of its provisions,' under the Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, Article 31(3)(a). Arguably, the 1991 agreement is more 
appropriately viewed as a 'deal,' reflecting compromises designed to diffuse 
political tension that had developed between the parties (following the 
Tiananmen crackdown'),8 and justified on pragmatic grounds (such as 'work-
ability' and the benefits of erecting the Court of Final Appeal before 19979). 
Neither does the 1995 agreement — which contains no direct reference to 
the Joint Declaration, and has been depicted by British officials as the best 
possible deal under the circumstances,10 by political commentators as 'capitu-
lation/acquiescence to Chinese demands,'11 and by critics as a 'sell-out'12 — 
amount to an agreement on interpretation or application of provisions in the 
Joint Declaration sufficiently authoritative to displace an ordinary meaning 
that is consistent with the Declaration's object and purpose. In a similar vein, 
unless expressly provided in a later agreement concluded in accordance with 
applicable rules, the 'mutuality' of conduct by itself bestows no amending or 
modifying effect on the subsequent practice of the parties, particularly when it 
contradicts the clear meaning of the article in question. 
Frank Ching, 'The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Joint Liaison Group's 
Agreement on Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal,' a paper presented at a Zonta Club Forum on the 
Court of Final Appeal, 21 October 1994. 
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 See Shui-hing Lo, 'The Politics of the Court of Final Appeal Debate in Hong Kong' (1993) 29 Issues 
& Studies 105, 119, 124; Stacy Mosher, 'Court of Contention,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 
19 December 1991, p 10. 
See speech by Secretary for Constitutional Affairs (Mr Michael Sze) on the motion debate on the 
Court of Final Appeal in the Legislative Council on 4 December 1991. Note that the early 
establishment of the CFA, regarded as probably the most important consideration underlying the 
1991 agreement, forms no part of the 1995 agreement (the agreed date for setting up the court is 1 July 
1997). 
See Louise de Rosario, 'A Court Too Far,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 June 1995, p 20. 
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 See 'Britain Gives in on CFA,' Hong Kong Standard, 10 June 1995, p 1. 
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 See report by Lily Mak, 'Hong Kong "Sold Out" Says Lee,' Hong Kong Standard, 10 June 1995, p 4; 
see also Martin Lee, 'Courting Disaster,' South China Morning Post, 14 June 1995, p 19. 
Vol 26 Part 3 The joint declaration and the CFA agreement 279 
Also of doubtful validity is a line of argument paraphrasing the issue as one, 
not of interpretation or modification, but of 'subsequent elaboration of a 
general principle.' Specifically, it has been contended13 that the Joint Decla-
ration lays down a general principle that the CFA is to have a power to invite 
judges from other common law jurisdictions to sit on the court, but leaves the 
precise scope of that power to be defined in the course of implementation of that 
general principle. In other words, the relevant articles in the Joint Declaration 
(as well as in the Basic Law) are said to be merely 'framework provisions which 
are intended to be fleshed out by more detailed legislative provisions.' 
Yet it remains true that the mode of implementation (for example, through 
legislative prescription) must not circumvent the primary international obli-
gation to perform the treaty in good faith (namely in accordance with the 
'ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose'). 'An arrangement that denies the Court of 
Final Appeal flexibility in the choice of judges and unduly inhibits its power to 
invite overseas judges does not fully comply with one of the Joint Declaration's 
cornerstone promises of judicial autonomy.'14 
Of greater concern, perhaps, is the issue of the CFA's jurisdiction, or more 
specifically, the stipulation inserted into the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal 
Ordinance, pursuant to the 1995 agreement, that '[t]he Court shall have no 
jurisdiction over acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs.'15 Although 
this clause merely replicates Article 19 of the Basic Law, its compatibility with 
the Joint Declaration should still be assessed in light of the applicable interna-
tional treaty rules. An evaluation conducted within such a framework would, 
arguably, yield the conclusion that a severe restriction is imposed on the CFA 
which is inconsistent with both the judicial power postulated in the Joint 
Declaration and the constitutional doctrines affecting the decision-making 
process by local judges under a system internationally guaranteed to be 
maintained. 
In particular, the incorporation in the CFA Ordinance of undefined (or 
loosely defined16) constraints, combined with a lack of explicit reference to 
In a letter dated 17 November 1994 from the Attorney General (] F Mathews) to the Chairman of 
the Hong Kong Bar Association, enclosing a British government statement on the Court of Final 
Appeal. 
See conclusion in International Commission of Jurists, Countdown to 1997, Report of a Mission to Hong 
Kong (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1992), p 91 ('the agreement reached by the Joint 
Liaison Group on the composition of the Court of Final Appeal is contrary to the Joint Declaration 
and the Basic Law and is constitutionally invalid; the Court of Final Appeal itself should be allowed 
to determine the number and identity of foreign judges to sit as temporary members'). 
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (No 79 of 1995), s 4(2). 
In fact, the term 'such as' — rather than illustrate — has introduced an additional element of 
imprecision and vulnerability to an expansive interpretation. Note also that in the Chinese text of 
the 1995 agreement, the CFA shall have 'no jurisdiction over acts of state, that is, defence and foreign 
affairs, etcetera.' See Martin Lee (note 12 above). 
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interpretative sources17 and a failure to identify the determining authorities,18 
casts serious doubts on the implementation of the commitment in the Joint 
Declaration to vest the court with the 'power of final adjudication.' Whereas 
under the present common law system, the act of state exclusion is most 
narrowly construed and rarely invoked,19 should other reference contexts 
prevail or defining power be removed from the judicial domain, the act of state 
exemption may arbitrarily expand at a heavy cost to judicial independence, 
citizens' rights, and the rule of law in Hong Kong. 
Similar misgivings may be directed at any attempt to totally oust the judicial 
function in respect of 'questions of fact concerning [the undefined] acts of 
state.'20 It is generally expected that where certain questions arise in the course 
of proceedings related to facts, circumstances, or events which are 'peculiarly 
within the cognisance of the Executive'21 (for example, extent of territory, 
existence of a state of war, belligerency/neutrality, determination of status diat 
entitles one to immunity from process, or recognition of a state/government), 
judges would seek the executive's statement or certification. Yet, the legal 
effects of the certified 'facts of state' (as well as the interpretation of the 
certificate itself) are matters that fall solely within the province of the 
judiciary.22 Indeed, to preserve the judicial independence bestowed upon them 
in the Joint Declaration, HKSAR judges must not permit the expression of 
executive policy to usurp entirely the judicial function and must guard against 
the 'trap' of'what may begin by guidance as to the principles to be applied and 
end in cases being decided irrespective of any principle in accordance with the 
view of the Executive as to what is politically expedient.'23 
Independent judges in an autonomous regime may also be trusted not to 
'embarrass or interfere with the Executive'24 or hurt the national interest, by 
applying 'judicial restraint and abstention' which is said to be 'inherent in the 
very nature of the judicial process.'25 That the curtailment of judicial autonomy 
It may be queried, for example, whether the term 'acts of state' should be interpreted by reference to 
English common law or—given its adoption in the present context from the Basic Law — be regarded 
as a matter of interpretation of the Basic Law. 
As a general rule in common law countries, the courts determine what constitutes an act of state. It 
has been argued, however, that — as in respect of other provisions in the Basic Law — the final arbiter 
regarding acts of state in the HKSAR would be the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, in accordance with Art 158 of the Basic Law. 
Not even all acts related to foreign affairs and defence are beyond the scope of judicial power. Nor 
can the act of state exception be relied upon to usurp court authority over events on home territory. 
Clearly, acts of the executive affecting private rights would be subject to review if they are amenable 
to the judicial process. 
CFA Ordinance, s 4(3). 
See F A Mann, Foreign Affairs in English Courts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p 23. 
Ibid, p 52. It may also be noted that English courts have tried to mitigate effects of the rigid 
certification — ibid. 
Mann, ibid, quoting Lord Cross of Chelsea in The Philippine Admiral [1977] AC 373, 399. 
The rationale underlying the act of state doctrine: see die leading American decision in Baker v Can 
369 US 186 (1962). 
Buttes Gas v Hammer [1982] AC 888, 932 (per Lord Wilberforce). 
